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1 Introduction
The papers in this section address the future orientation of the European Higher
Education Area—perhaps by implication also of higher education more broadly.
The immediate background is an initiative by several members and consultative
members of the BFUG to launch a discussion of the future of the EHEA in prep-
aration of the 2015 Ministerial meeting (Bologna Process 2014a). The debate was
launched at the BFUG meeting in Athens in April 2014 (Bologna Process 2014b),
was the main issue at the meeting of the BFUG in Roma on September 18–19, 2014
(Bologna Process 2014c) and will also feed into the drafting of the Yerevan
Communiqué and the preparation of the Ministerial meeting in May 2015.
The substantial reasons for the debate are more complex. A large majority of
EHEA member countries participated in ministerial conferences at political level up
to and including 2010,1 when the EHEA was formally declared. The Bologna
Process helped put higher education reform ﬁrmly on the political agenda in Europe
as well as in individual countries. Nevertheless, political interest now seems to be
waning and at the ministerial conference in Bucureşti in 20122 more countries were
represented at senior ofﬁcial than at political level. Is this because there is a feeling
that the EHEA has achieved all it was intended to achieve, because the initial goals
are now seen as too ambitious and nobody wants to be associated with failure,
because the EHEA is seen to lose focus and become everything to all people,
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because an increasing focus on implementation implies that the EHEA is now seen
as an administrative—some would say bureaucratic—rather than as a political
challenge, or simply because as “Bologna” ceases to be new it is also perceived to
cease to be innovative and politically interesting?
The perception that the EHEA is seen as being of less political pertinence now
that the Area has formally been established is underlined by the relative lack of
involvement by a number of countries in the BFUG—by absence or by relatively
passive participation where the representatives of several countries only very rarely
take the floor in debates—as well as by statements by political decision makers and
senior ofﬁcials and by the education priorities of many participating countries.
The Bologna Process responded to the political agenda of decision makers in the
mid- to late 1990s, (see e.g. Attali 1998). In positive terms, it offered a forum for
devising common solutions to common challenges, even if these solutions had to be
implemented within national frameworks which each had its own traditions and
peculiarities. In more negative terms, Ministers may have felt it was easier to
undertake difﬁcult reforms challenging set ways and strong interest groups if these
could be placed in a European framework, where others had to take similarly strong
medicine.
The debate in the EHEA has focused on three questions outlined in the note by
the BFUG members and consultative members who launched the debate (Bologna
Process 2014a):
1. What are the goals to which Ministers have committed on which work still
remains so that commitments will be met?
2. What should be the main goals and issues of the EHEA in the near to medium
term?
3. How should the EHEA be organized to achieve these goals?
We might perhaps phrase this in terms of a discussion focusing and what needs
to be wrapped up, what needs to be launched, and how the EHEA should be
governed and organized.
2 Unﬁnished Business
The ﬁrst decade of the EHEA—the Bologna Process in the narrow, formal sense of
the term—was characterized by strong concentration on structural reforms.
Qualiﬁcations frameworks, quality assurance, the recognition of qualiﬁcations, and
transparency instruments remain important elements of both the EHEA and national
policy, and were the subject of one of four working groups in the 2012–2015 EHEA
work program (Bologna Process 2014d). As Robert Harmsen points out in his
contribution (Harmsen 2015), especially in the early years, the goals were clear and
the ways in which they would be achieved were considered to be reasonably
straightforward.
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However, the formal education structures have largely been reformed, or at least
so many public authorities would say. A number of countries have yet to establish
and self-certify their national qualiﬁcations frameworks or set up quality assurance
agencies that comply with the European Standards and Guidelines (Bologna
Process 2012). All but Greece have ratiﬁed the Lisbon Recognition Convention, but
far from all have implemented the provisions of the Convention in their own
legislation and practice. The notion that one should look for how a foreign quali-
ﬁcation may be recognized rather than how recognition may be denied has still not
been universally absorbed. Almost ten years after the deadline by which Ministers
pledged to issue the Diploma Supplement automatically, free of charge, and in a
widely spoken language, the pledge is still conjugated in the future tense. In its
report to the 2015 Ministerial meeting, the Structural Reforms Working Group
draws together proposals concerning four policy areas—quality assurance, quali-
ﬁcations frameworks, recognition of qualiﬁcations, transparency instruments—to
launch the concept of a European infrastructure for transparency and recognition
(Bologna Process 2014d).
Nevertheless, the emphasis in structural reforms will shift from developing the
structures to implementing them. Learning outcomes need to be put at the center of
institutional and individual practice as well as of qualiﬁcations frameworks;
countries and institutions need to adapt their practice to the requirements of the
Lisbon Recognition Convention; and institutions must issue the Diploma
Supplements as Ministers promised that institutions would do by 2005. At their
2015 conference, Ministers also seem likely to follow the suggestion by the
Structural Reforms Working Group and ask the European Commission, the Council
of Europe, and UNESCO to review and revise the Diploma Supplement.
Implementation is a much more challenging task than setting goals. Goals can be
set at European level by Ministers. Implementation, on the other hand, relies not
only on the public authorities of the 47 member countries of the EHEA, but even
more on the adherence and action of higher education institutions, students, and
faculty. A shifting emphasis from developing structures to ensuring that they work
in practice implies shifting the focus from the European to the national and insti-
tutional level, with the attendant risk that uneven national and institutional imple-
mentation of what look like compatible structures on paper or, more elegantly, de
jure, may mean that these structures will in the end not be compatible de facto.
Focusing on implementation also means that unless something goes drastically
wrong, and this is perceived to be either a huge problem or something that can
usefully be blamed on political opponents in a national context, a shift from
deﬁning policy objectives to implementing them will probably mean reducing the
political relevance and—to use one of the catch words of today’s new speak—the
visibility of the European Higher Education Area.
One important question for the future of the EHEA, then, is how different levels
of policy and implementation interact. This has a governance aspect, as Robert
Harmsen points out, but governance can best be dealt with as an issue of its own.
Armağan Erdoğan (Erdoğan 2015) explores the implementation of Bologna
policies in Turkey and demonstrates how the policy goals of the EHEA have guided
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the development of the Turkish higher education system. At the same time, she also
shows that the Turkish system responded to many challenges that would have
arisen even if the Bologna Process had not been launched. The challenges would
perhaps to a large extent have been the same and they arise from demographic as
well as societal, international, and technological developments. The solutions
devised would, however, not have been flavored à la bolognaise, and developing a
higher education system with a considerable degree of compatibility with those of
other European countries would possibly not have been an objective. The choice of
Turkey for the case study is signiﬁcant: Turkey is a large European country with an
extensive system that has become considerably larger since Turkey joined the
Bologna Process in 2001. It is not an EU member but has—or has at least had—EU
membership as an important political goal and is, regardless of whether EU
membership will materialize, strongly influenced by economic and political
developments both within the European Union and in other parts of Europe.
3 Between Wrapping Up and Launching New Policies:
Bologna and the Rest of the World
Turkey is, as Erdoğan points out in her article, by its geography, its history, and its
cultural traditions, an important link between Europe, the Middle East, and Central
Asia. Turkey is a country standing on the inside looking out and, perhaps more than
most other EHEA countries, in a position to relate to a group of countries standing
on the outside looking in.
During its ﬁrst few years of life, the Bologna Process was essentially inward
looking. That was perhaps understandable since the journey toward the European
Higher Education Area was an innovative venture into largely unchartered territory,
but isolation is rarely a recipe for success. In the classical French tragedy, the ideal
is to be loved, but it is better to be hated than to be ignored. At least, as seen by
much of the world outside Europe, the Bologna Process was in this enviable ideal
situation, even if voices inside Europe were a mix of those ardently in favor and
those equally ardently against “Bologna”—but “Bologna” rarely suffered the
indignity of being ignored. Avoiding this misfortune in the future is, however, one
of the challenges facing the EHEA as it reaches adolescence.
The charge of Eurocentrism may, however, not have been entirely unjustiﬁed also
beyond the ﬁrst few years. When the EHEA explicitly opened up to the world with
that classical instrument of bureaucracy, a policy strategy (Bologna Process 2007),
this was labeled as addressing the global dimension only after a longish and quite
ardent discussion on doing away with the term “external dimension”. One could
perhaps not have blamed those who felt that it connoted too crass a distinction
between those on the inside reluctantly looking out, and those on the outside eagerly
looking in, possibly with the added message of “stay where you are”.
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The interest from other parts of the world was real, and to its credit, the EHEA
rose to it, even if it took some time, and the “external” dimension evolved into the
global dimension. In my view, the early years of the Bologna Process were more
inspired by US higher education than many European policy makers care to admit,
and it is signiﬁcant that the US is also where some of the early interest in “Bologna
developments” arose. Attitudes in the US span from Cliff Adelman’s enthusiastic
assertion that “it is not so much when Bologna will arrive in the US as how”
(Adelman 2009),3 through Paul Gaston’s description of the “Challenge of Bologna”
(Gaston 2010), to quite hesitant reactions by several higher education leaders to the
Lumina Foundation’s attempt at introducing the concept of qualiﬁcations frame-
works in the US.4
Another set of non-EHEA countries interested by the EHEA is discussed by
QueAnh Dang (2015). Dang describes how Asia addresses the “challenge of
Bologna”. Again, the choice of continent is signiﬁcant. Asia is very likely the
continent that European policy makers see as the most signiﬁcant to their own
future, and more often for economic than academic reasons. Europeans, however,
often fail to appreciate the diversity of Asia, with countries ranging in population
from China and India to the Maldives and Bhutan, and with great diversity of
higher education traditions, social inclusion (or the lack thereof), political, social,
and religious traditions, and economic performance. Europe is, in my view, a
unique balance of what we have in common and what is particular to each country,
culture, and tradition. Asia and other continents also blend common and distinct
heritages and traditions but, with the possible exception of Latin America and
certainly of North America, the balance is more toward diversity.
As Dang clearly describes, to the extent we can refer to a common Asian policy
toward the EHEA, it is one of adaptation rather than wholesale importation and
copying. This is, in my view, a wise choice. The EHEA may serve as inspiration and
can provide a wide array of lessons about measures that have worked and other
measures that have worked less well, and EHEA countries can provide important
contextual information: what worked and failed in what contexts and circumstances?
QueAnh Dang’s article links to the ongoing discussion about how cooperation
between the EHEA and the rest of the world should be organized. In 2009, the ﬁrst
Bologna Policy Forum was held end-on with that year’s Ministerial conference.
The intention was to provide a forum for identifying common issues and possible
cooperation between the EHEA and non-EHEA countries. The Bologna Policy
Forum was high level, with the participation of most of the ministers who partic-
ipated in the EHEA Ministerial meeting as well as Ministers and/or high ranking
3The quote is taken form a presentation Cliff Adelman delivered to the ECTN4 Final Conference
“Chemistry and the Bologna Process” on September 9–10, 2009 in Dresden, available at http://
ectn-assoc.cpe.fr/network/ECTN4_FinalConf_Dresden2009/ECTN4FC009_03_Adelman.pdf,
accessed January 6, 2015.
4At a conference organized by the Lumina Foundation in Washington, DC in July 2009 in which
the author participated, attitudes to qualiﬁcations frameworks ranged from quite enthusiastic to
skeptical.
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civil servants from the non-EHEA countries invited. Incidentally, one of these—
Kazakhstan—joined the European Higher Education Area a year later.
The Bologna Policy Forum was intended as a start, and in 2010 and 2012 similar
Fora were held end-on with the Ministerial conferences. However, there is an
increasing feeling—in my view justiﬁed—that, while the Policy Forum may have
made a promising start, this start has not been followed up and that cooperation
between the EHEA and other regions has not advanced.
Most likely, there are several reasons for this lack of follow up. One is that many
EHEA countries see their cooperation with other countries partly as cooperation
and partly as marketing. The two are not always easy to distinguish, and at least for
the marketing part, the countries with well-established foreign contacts and that
host a large number of students from outside of the EHEA prefer to market their
systems as national rather than as part of the EHEA. In the case of EU countries, it
matters a great deal whether students come from outside of the EU or not because
this will determine the kind of study fees they may be charged. The EHEA has so
far not succeeded in developing a common label with which to present itself to the
rest of the world and it is unlikely that all members would want it to do so.
Secondly, the politically focused Bologna Policy Fora have not been comple-
mented by more focused cooperation between policy makers and practitioners
focused on speciﬁc policy areas. This is a statement that immediately needs to be
qualiﬁed. As Dang points out, the Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) is a forum for
political as well as practical cooperation, and organizations like the European
University Association (EUA), EURASHE, the European Students Union
(ESU) and ENQA are engaged in cooperation well beyond Europe on topics that are
highly relevant to the EHEA. Individual institutions and countries within the EHEA
are similarly engaged, and some organizations without formal links to the EHEA
have organized EHEA-themed activities. However, while the EHEA is an important
reference in many—probably most—of these initiatives, there is no EHEA agenda,
coordination, or for that matter ﬁnancing of such cooperation initiatives.
The relative lack of direction and the tension between cooperation and marketing
come to the fore also in the BFUG discussion about how to organize the Bologna
Policy Fora. In the view of some members, the format followed so far should be
continued, as it allows to gather high ranking representatives of countries from all
parts of the world for a policy discussion every two or three years. However, this
format has so far not proved a resounding success, and both the level of repre-
sentation and the participation in the plenary discussions by non-EHEA delegations
at the 2012 edition of the Policy Forum indicate that if this is to be the format of
future Policy Fora, ways need to be found to make them more attractive and these
ways have yet to be identiﬁed.
Other BFUG members argue that a new format should be tried, focusing on
either a narrow set of policy areas or a narrower set of participating countries—
preferably from only one region—or both. In the course of a cycle of Policy Fora,
one could potentially cover most regions and a range of policy issues. Neither
option is entirely satisfactory and the second is so far untested. In fall 2014, the
Bologna Follow Up Group had quite intense discussion on the format of the 2015
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Policy Forum, with members quite divided between those who wanted to keep the
current format, and those who considered it necessary to try a new format focusing
on a single region at a time and possibly also on a limited number of issues. The
compromise solution was a variety of the second, a kind of “single region +” or
“single region, but” approach.
4 Future Priorities
Even if structural reform have been paramount in the development of the EHEA,
other policy areas have also been important. Institutional autonomy, academic
freedom, and student participation are underlying values of the EHEA. Even if the
degree to which they are present in the debate varies, they were a factor in the
negative assessment of Belarus’ application to join the EHEA in 2012, as well as in
the informal discussions that led to Belarus’ refraining from applying for accession
in 2005. There are admittedly also concerns about the extent to which these values
are reflected in the policies of some current EHEA members. The social dimension
has been on the EHEA agenda for at least a decade—it could reasonably be argued
that it was introduced at the Praha ministerial meeting in 2001—but there are still
somewhat different interpretations of what the social dimension actually comprises
and the BFUG has faced problems in deﬁning clear and measurable commitments
in this area.
A discussion about future priorities cannot, therefore, be entirely divorced from a
consideration of what has been achieved so far and what issues need to be wrapped
up. The discussion about the future orientation of the EHEA at and leading up to the
2015 Ministerial conference will be an important milestone, but it will not be a
complete hiatus. It will be a reorientation, but not a turnaround.
Structural reforms have been discussed in some detail above. It seems very likely
that whatever else will be on the “Bologna agenda”, structural reforms will be in a
prominent position. How can the EHEA prevent uneven implementation of EHEA
policies from undermining the idea of a European Higher Education Area with
coherent structures? Broad coordination of both national policies, including legis-
lation, and the practice of higher education institutions will be needed, but it is
unclear how this could be achieved and ﬁnanced, all the more so as countries that
are less advanced in their development of national qualiﬁcations frameworks and
quality assurance provision will not all be able or willing to ﬁnance broad partic-
ipation in activities like policy seminars and peer learning projects.
It is also unclear whether countries are willing to undertake extensive new obli-
gations in this area. For example, the Structural Reforms Working Group (SRWG)
proposes that countries review their legislation to ensure that it be compatible with the
Lisbon Recognition Convention (Bologna Process 2014d, pp. 70–71). This is an
important proposal and it should be straightforward since one can reasonably assume
that when countries ratify an international treaty they intend to adjust their national
legislation within reasonable time. Nevertheless, experience suggests that his may be
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too rosy a view of reality, as borne out by the analysis of the national action plans
submitted by Ministers prior to the 2007 Ministerial conference (Rauhvargers and
Rusakova 2010). The SRWGalso proposes that theDiploma Supplement be reviewed
(Bologna Process 2014d, p. 74). This makes sense because the current Supplement
antedates the EHEA and was developed by the Council of Europe, the European
Commission, and UNESCO in the mid- to late 1990s. Since the Diploma Supplement
belongs to three international institutions and two different frameworks—the Lisbon
Recognition Convention and Europass—reviewing it will be a complex undertaking,
and this is further underlined by the fact that it has acquired legal status in some
countries. That the process will be complex is, however, not a reason not to launch it.
On the other hand, positions do evolve. In 2005 Ministers rejected a proposal
that short cycle qualiﬁcations be included in the overarching framework of quali-
ﬁcations of the EHEA (QF-EHEA), and watered the text of the Bergen
Communiqué (Bologna Process 2005) down to say these qualiﬁcations could be
included within the ﬁrst cycle in national frameworks. Ten years later, the Structural
Reforms Working Group proposes that short cycle qualiﬁcation at long last be
recognized explicitly in the QF-EHEA (Bologna Process 2014d, p. 63) and this
proposal was accepted by the BFUG without objections.
Structural reforms have been prominent in the “Bologna agenda” because they
were high on the agenda of many Ministers in the late 1990s, when the Bologna
Process was launched. This alone was insufﬁcient: structural reforms fulﬁlled two
additional criteria: it was possible to deﬁne relatively clear objectives (a point also
made by Harmsen 2015), and they lent themselves to the relatively loose kind of
international cooperation that has been a hallmark of the EHEA, more about which
when we turn to governance. The challenge will be to ﬁnd policy areas that fulﬁll
all three criteria. The ﬁnancing of higher education is high on the agenda of all
ministers but it is unclear to what extent clear goals can be deﬁned that are seen as
relevant by all—or at least the great majority of—the 47 EHEA countries, which
have vastly different ﬁnancial capacities, very different views on the proper balance
between public and private funding, and a very broad range of ﬁnancial support
systems for students, ranging from reasonably generous to almost absent. In
Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve (Bologna Process 2009) the Ministers agreed to aim for
20 % mobility by 2020. That this goal is among the pending issues of the EHEA is
mainly due to the fact that mobility has increased far less than had been expected
when the Bologna Process was launched, but it may also become an issue of
deﬁning what the seemingly straightforward “20 %” actually means when the time
comes to assess whether the goal has been reached.
5 Governance
It would be difﬁcult to imagine an international cooperation arrangement that is
much more loosely organized than the EHEA. In the early years, what is now the
Bologna Follow Up Group was chaired by the country holding the EU presidency,
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and this country also provided the secretariat. At the Praha Ministerial meeting,
Ministers established what is now the Bologna Board (then called a preparatory
group) and also established a group of consultative members—at least that is how
the text5 was interpreted (Bologna Process 2001). At the Berlin meeting, Ministers
decided that the Bologna Secretariat should be provided by the country hosting the
following ministerial conference for the entire period between the two conferences
(Bologna Process 2003) and in Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve they decided that the
BFUG should be co-chaired by the country holding the EU Presidency as well as by
a non-EU country (Bologna Process 2009).
That is, in a nutshell, the formal organization of the EHEA. The organization has
been so informal that the BFUG has at times managed to adopt different voting
rules for different issues. At one point, the rules said that countries offering to host a
ministerial conference were not allowed to vote on the proposal, whereas countries
running for the Bologna Board at the time when a part of the membership was
elected were allowed to vote, albeit with the provision that they not vote for
themselves. The rules did, however, not specify how this particular provision was to
be enforced in a vote by secret ballot.
There is strong attachment within the BFUG to this loose organizational struc-
ture and any suggestion that a stronger structure might be needed has been met with
resistance. This applies to the possibility of establishing the European Higher
Education Area through an international convention, discussed in the run-up to the
Bergen Ministerial conference in 2005, as well as an initiative by the Council of
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly to have the Bologna Secretariat established in the
Council of Europe (Council of Europe 2009). This initiative did not have the
support of the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Higher Education and
Research or of the Secretariat, since we were convinced the Council of Europe
would serve the EHEA better as a consultative member, and also because we were
well aware that the proposal did not have support among EHEA members.
The European Higher Education Area has two important functions: it is a formal
framework within which members establish coherent and compatible higher edu-
cation policies and it is a set of good practices. In the former sense, the EHEA is a
framework of which a country is a member or it is not, and it is a framework relying
on certain structures. These include the Bologna Follow Up Group and Board,
working groups and the Bologna Secretariat. Individual higher education institu-
tions are not members of the EHEA, whose members are governments. Higher
education institutions belong to the higher education system of a country that is a
member of the EHEA or they do not. These are fairly loose and informal structures
but they are clearly established and the membership is clear.
In the second sense, the EHEA is a community of practice and the examples of
good practice are available to everyone. Public authorities, higher education
5“The European University Association, the European Association of Institutions in Higher
Education (EURASHE), the National Unions of Students in Europe and the Council of Europe
should be consulted in the follow-up work.”
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institutions, and individual faculty and students may be inspired by good examples
developed within the EHEA regardless of whether they work in an EHEA country
or not—that is an important point raised in QueAnh Dang’s article. As Robert
Harmsen points out, policy learning is an important aspect of the EHEA also for
EHEA members.
What kind of governance arrangements the EHEA will need in the future
depends to a large extent on what vision members have for its future. The more that
vision tilts toward mutual learning and exchange of good practice, the less formal
the governance model needs to be. The more the EHEA is seen as a framework
within which students and faculty can move as freely as possible thanks to common
or at least compatible structures, such as qualiﬁcations frameworks and standards
for quality assurance, and the more EHEA members are seen as undertaking
obligations toward each other, the stronger will be the need for a governance model
that can ensure that structures remain compatible and that mutual obligations be
honored.
So far there is a sense that the governance structures should be as informal as
possible, but there is no discernible consensus on exactly what this means. The
stock taking exercises that were launched in 2003, with the ﬁrst stock taking report
presented to the Bergen meeting in 2005, originally relied on self-reporting by
members. Since then, the reporting has been strengthened by the important con-
tribution of Eurydice and others so that the current Implementation reports are seen
as considerably more objective and reliable than the ﬁrst reports. There is, however,
no consensus on what consequences, if any, the Implementation Reports should
have in relation to countries that are far from implementing speciﬁc policy goals.
This is illustrated by the fact that the only issue on which the SRWG delivered a
split recommendation to the BFUG meeting of November 27–28, 2014 was a
recommendation to the effect that the BFUG co-chairs and the Bologna Secretariat
be mandated to contact the competent authorities of EHEA members with an
unsatisfactory implementation of structural reforms in the 2015 EHEA
Implementation Report with offers of assistance. After some debate, the BFUG
accepted the thrust of this recommendation but softened the wording to emphasize
offers of policy dialogue (Bologna Process 2014d, p. 24).
One issue, then, is the degree to which the EHEA may or may not need a BFUG
with a stronger mandate than it currently has. Another is the relationship between
BFUG members and the political leadership of their Ministries. Today, this varies
considerably. In some cases, the BFUG members have close contacts with their
political leadership and are known—or at least widely assumed—to speak with
authority on behalf of their countries. In other cases, it is much less clear whether
BFUG members effectively speak on behalf of the political leadership or merely on
their own behalf. BFUG members are of course unlikely to announce that they do
not consult with or do not have the ear of their political decision makers, but a
formal announcement is not always needed for the impression to
develop. A stronger governance of the EHEA would therefore also require that
BFUG members have stronger and more explicit mandates from their own political
decision makers.
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The third element of the governance model is the Bologna Secretariat. As we
have seen, the Secretariat structure has already evolved from one provided by the
Chairmanship country of the BFUG, and therefore changing every six months, to
one based in and provided by the host country of the following ministerial con-
ference. The Secretariat therefore serves for two or three years, depending on the
timing of the Ministerial conferences, and this has meant a better back up for the
BFUG than what was provided in the early years, even though several of the
rotating secretariats linked to the BFUG Chairmanships did a very good job under
the circumstances, possibly with the Greek chairmanship and secretariat in spring
2003 as the outstanding example.
When the current Secretariat arrangements were launched in fall 2003, there was
a discussion of whether countries could be invited to second ofﬁcials to the
Secretariat and Norway, which hosted the ﬁrst Secretariat of this kind, stated that it
would have welcomed secondments. However, none materialized and possible
practical arrangements, e.g. with a view to offsetting the high cost of living in
Norway for ofﬁcials seconded from countries with lower salaries, were never
explored. The discussion of whether to divorce the Secretariat from the hosting of
the next Ministerial conference has now been relaunched but the consequences have
so far not been spelled out in any great detail. With the exception of the Secretariat
serving between 2007 and 2010, which was provided jointly by Belgium (both
communities), Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and based in Bruxelles/Brussel
under Belgian legislation, all Secretariats since 2003 have been made up of resi-
dents of the host country of the Secretariat and hired under the labor legislation of
that country.
If this model were to be changed, there seem to be three broad options. In the
ﬁrst option, the Secretariat could be attached to or become a part of an existing
international organization, in which case the framework of operation would be
clear, but as we have seen, any suggestions in this sense have met with considerable
resistance, and no organization has actually offered to provide or host the Bologna
Secretariat. The second option would be to establish the Secretariat as an inde-
pendent entity, but this would require that many complex legal issues be clariﬁed,
including the legislation under which the Secretariat would operate and its staff be
hired and—in the worst of cases—ﬁred, what the social security arrangements for
staff members would be, and who would bear ultimate ﬁnancial and legal
responsibility for the Secretariat and its staff. The third option would be to establish
the Secretariat as part of an existing national structure and encourage and make
arrangements for secondments from other EHEA members, as France has now done
in its invitation to host the Secretariat in 2015–18 and the ministerial conference in
2018. This would be legally less complex, but arrangements for secondments would
need to be established, possible top up salaries secured, and there would need to be
agreement on, as well as acceptance by the host country of, the period for which the
Secretariat would be established. Since the purpose of divorcing the Secretariat
from the hosting of the following Ministerial conference would be to provide
greater continuity, it would presumably need to be established for a period that
would span at least two Ministerial conferences, preferably longer.
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The fourth element of governance is ﬁnancing. Rather, it is listed here as the
fourth element because it has not been very prominent in the BFUG discussion of
the “future of Bologna”, but it may well be argued that ﬁnancing is the ﬁrst element
in order of importance. The fact that the EHEA has no independent budget might be
seen as both a reason for and consequence of its loosely organized governance. For
a process in which policy goals are agreed at European level but implemented
nationally and within higher education institutions, not having an “EHEA budget”
may not seem an unnatural option. It does, however, mean that no EHEA body can
decide to allocate resources to assist countries or institutions with implementing
policies or develop projects that could have particular relevance to the future
development of the EHEA or to launch research on a particular issue of policy or
implementation, nor does the EHEA have the resources to bring together practi-
tioners for peer learning activities or promote and develop the global dimension of
the EHEA.
Individual countries, of course, do have resources and so does the European
Commission. To put it bluntly, the EHEA would not have been possible had the
Commission not provided massive ﬁnancial support for various initiatives and also
had the Commission not extended such support to almost all EHEA countries,
rather than just those that are either EU members or participating in given EU
programs.6 However welcome ﬁnancial support by the European Commission and
individual countries is, these are for obvious reasons hesitant to delegate authority
over their own budgets to the BFUG and there is therefore no EHEA budget in the
real sense of the term. It is difﬁcult to see how the governance of the EHEA could
be signiﬁcantly strengthened without some kind of EHEA budget over which the
BFUG would have decision making authority. At the same time, it is difﬁcult to see
how an EHEA budget in this sense could be established today, when most EHEA
members suffer cuts in public budgets coupled with increasing demands for
accountability.
6 Toward a Conclusion
Drawing a conclusion concerning the future is by deﬁnition a Sisyphean task. At the
time of writing, the BFUG has not made ﬁnal recommendation to ministers and
ministers have not adopted their Yerevan Communiqué, which will be the policy
6This was, incidentally, the framework for membership of the Bologna Process until 2003, when it
was decided that “Countries party to the European Cultural Convention shall be eligible for
membership of the European Higher Education Area provided that they at the same time declare
their willingness to pursue and implement the objectives of the Bologna Process in their own
systems of higher education.” (Bologna Process 2003). By way of contrast, the Prague
Communiqué noted that “Ministers welcomed new members to join the Bologna process after
applications from Ministers representing countries for which the European Community pro-
grammes Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci or Tempus-Cards are open.” (Bologna Process 2001).
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instruments through which they may reorient the EHEA. There are therefore still
opportunities for higher education practitioners and policy makers at different levels
to make their voices heard. This section of the books arising from the Bologna
Researchers Conference provides a valuable contribution to this debate through
three reasoned and well-researched contributions as well as, it is hoped, through this
essay brining the section together. Rather than seeking to draw an overriding
conclusion from three contributions that all stand on their own and that approach
the “future of Bologna” from different angles, I would like to offer a ﬁnal thought
from yet another angle.
With the possible exception of “employability”, there is hardly a word that
occurs as frequently in current education debate as “quality”. However, quality is
more often than not presented as an established entity, something that is “out there”
and all we have to do is strive for it and preferably achieve it. However, it makes
little sense to assess whether we do something well unless we know what we are
trying to do in the ﬁrst place. The quality debate may be rich in describing ways of
reaching and not least measuring quality, but it is surprisingly divorced from
considerations of what purposes education should serve (Bergan 2005; Council of
Europe 2007, 2012).
Consideration of the link between higher education reform and the broader
purposes of higher education has also been subdued in the development of the
EHEA. This is not to say it has been absent. The EHEA builds on a set of values
that comprise academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and student participation,
and several communiqués refer to the multiple purpose of higher education.
Nevertheless, a relaunch of the European Higher Education Area, intended to
give higher education policy the place it deserves in European debate, but equally to
give European societies the kind of higher education they deserve and that they
need for their future developments, will require a much more sustained debate on
the kind of Europe we would like to have and the kind of education we will need to
achieve our goal. This debate will need to be philosophical and practical at the same
time, since it will need to establish a clear connection between principles, policy,
and practice. That will hopefully (re)motivate the higher education community, the
policy making community, and our community tout court. It is the kind of debate to
which the present author has sought to contribute (Bergan 2011) and to which the
following quote from the Canadian philosopher John Ralston Saul is highly
relevant:
And so I ﬁnd our education is increasingly one aimed at training loyal employees, even
though the state and the corporations are increasingly disloyal. What we should be doing is
quite different. It turns on our ability to rethink our education and our public expectations so
that we create a non-employee, non-loyal space for citizenship. After all, a citizen is by
deﬁnition loyal to the state because the state belongs to her or him. That is what frees the
citizen to be boisterous, outspoken, cantankerous and, all in all, by corporatist standards,
disloyal. This is the key to the success of our democracy (Saul 2009).
I would argue that the development of the European Higher Education Area has
so far seen four distinct phases. The ﬁrst phase, encompassing the ministerial
conferences at Sorbonne in 1998, in Bologna in 1999, and Praha in 2001, was one
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of launching the march toward the EHEA. It was an exciting phase but also a
relatively easy one, since ministers could focus their attention on setting goals that
would be achieved a decade hence.
The second phase, marked by the ministerial conferences in Berlin in 2003 and
Bergan in 2005, was one of development, and it was in this phase that two key
EHEA instruments—the ESG and the QF-EHEA were ﬁrst launched (Berlin) and
then adopted (Bergen). At the same time, this phase was also marked by the
sobering realization that, if the EHEA was to be based on its members achieving
their stated goals by 2010, one also had to assess the progress members made
toward those goals. This was the origin of the stocktaking reports, launched in 2003
and submitted for the ﬁrst time in 2005. This was also the phase in which the EHEA
became truly European with the broadening of the access criteria and an increase of
the number of member states from 33 in 2001 through 40 in 2003 to 45 in 2005.
The third phase, from London in 2007 through Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve in
2009 to Budapest and Wien in 2001—was one of consolidation. Some new ini-
tiatives were launched, including the Global Dimension Strategy (Bologna Process
2007), the Bologna Policy Forum and the “20 % by 2020” mobility goal, but as
2010 drew nearer, attention focused on fulﬁlling commitments already undertaken
rather than deﬁning new objectives.
The fourth phase comes with the establishment of the EHEA in 2010 and is
marked by the Bucureşti conference in 2012. In this phase, the EHEA continues to
develop, but at the same time there is diminishing political interest in the EHEA,
higher education is affected by the ﬁnancial crises—which admittedly began
already in 2008—and there is considerable uncertainty as to how the EHEA should
develop further.
Whether the discussions that these uncertainties have given rise to and that form
the backdrop of this section of the books will lead to the Yerevan conference in
May 2015 being considered as a ﬁfth phase of the EHEA and a new start is one of
the great challenges of the EHEA as it will hopefully develop from adolescence to
full maturity.
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